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Abstract: Fiscal policies coordination, macro-stability purposes and provision of 
European public goods are undoubtedly economic goals of paramount importance when 
considering the implementation of Fiscal Union at European level. However, there is also 
a complementary component of moral nature embedded in the constitution of any fiscal 
system, that is reallocation of resources. The core idea of the paper is that A Theory of 
Justice of John Rawls can provide a new and compelling basis accounting for the 
institution of European Fiscal Union in the redistributive perspective since the European 
Union holds a) a scheme of mutually advantageous cooperation and b) a thick network 
of institutions which constitute a basic structure. The main outcome of this analysis is a 
European difference principle. This conclusion is then followed by a corollary: if the 
European institutions are to be shaped to reflect an arrangement of Rawlsian nature, 
they should also include Fiscal Union at European level. 
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The European Union is a compound of nation-states characterized by a 
peculiar institutional asymmetry: as pointed out with different emphasis 
by Ferrera (2009), Martinsen (2013) and Scharpf (2002) while the European 
Union has a common economic infrastructure and governance, social wel-
fare policies remain an exclusive prerogative of the single member states1. 
This means that each European country has to design its own optimal 
social policy, with potential negative externalities on the other members 
(Andreozzi and Tamborini, 2019), to respond to the same common eco-
nomic frame outlined at European level (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Current Relationship between the Economic and Social Spheres within the EU 
 
Author’s visualization. The European member states operate within the same economic frame 
(indicated by the rectangular box), the so-called Single Market. In order to have a symmetrical 
institutional infrastructure, I assume that the whole rectangular should be “filled” with social 
policies at European level - complementary to the national ones - covering the areas of educa-
tion, labour, health care and so on and so forth. However, without a European parallel interven-
tion, the optimal social welfare policies adopted by the single member countries (represented by 
the white sets) to safeguard their own citizens cannot cover entirely the new economic space, 
thus leaving a zone of “social emptiness” (grey area). Furthermore, without a certain degree of 
coordination through European social policies, the social policy interventions of the single mem-
ber states might negatively interfere one with another (this might be the case where during a 
pandemic one country decides to vaccine all its citizens and the other none). 
 
                                                 
1 This is not equivalent to state that the European Union is lacking any type of shared 
social view (Buchanan, 1996; Dluhosch, 1997; Kölling, 2015; Streit and Mussler, 1995; 
Vaubel, 1996), but that its initiatives of social nature are very modest and often driven 
by reasons of pure economic compensation rather than being based on some explicit 
purposes of social justice (Maduro, 2000). 
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For instance, this might happen in the areas of education, labour or 
health care: in the current Covid-19 pandemic era it easy to imagine the 
costs which might be paid by some countries due to a missing coordinated 
policy action at large scale (Lago-Peñas et al., 2020). 
Such an institutional asymmetry contributes to generate a fragmented 
European social structure, where significant inequalities and heterogene-
ous re-distributive effects emerge between and within the European coun-
tries (Avram et al., 2014; Beckfield, 2006; Immervoll et al., 2006; Fredriksen, 
2012). This disharmonic pattern becomes even more evident during the 
moments of crisis: the absence of a unified social welfare action at Euro-
pean level prevents a prompt and efficient response to the social needs of 
the European citizens (Cantillon et al., 2017; Crespy and Menz, 2015; Fer-
rera, 2014; Martinsen and Vollaard, 2014). The current strong European 
response to the pandemic crisis certainly represents an unprecedented ex-
ception. Nevertheless, the risk is that this remains an occasional achieve-
ment. Thus, given the general unbalanced design it is possible to outline 
three alternatives for the future development of the European institutional 
framework. 
The first option is the retention of the status quo. The European Union 
can keep being an institutional chimera characterized by many uncoordi-
nated national welfare systems coexisting within a common economic 
frame. However, this alternative implies to continue to suffer the inequal-
ity flaws mentioned above, which raise from the existing gap between the 
economic integration and the social integration, or said otherwise, from the 
absence of solid principles of social justice at European level. 
The second option relies on a never old-fashioned paradigm, that is to 
re-align the economic and the social dimensions moving back to the orig-
inal state of affairs. According to this kind of view the European countries 
should withdraw from the Union, taking back those economic deci-
sion-making powers they have gradually ceased to the common institu-
tions: in the light of the recent Brexit case this alternative is not an abstract 
case study for professional thinkers anymore.  
The third and the last hypothesis, suggested among the others by Ma-
duro (2000), Sangiovanni (2013) and Vandenbroucke (2013), looks at the 
opposite direction and embraces the idea to rebalance the two dimensions 
pursuing a path of social integration through the expansion of the welfare 
intervention area of the common institutions. According to this perspective 
the European Union should be endowed with clear principles of social 
justice, with some concrete social welfare decision-making powers and 
with specific dedicated resources. 
In this paper I show how the constitutive elements which currently 
characterize the European Union fundamentally admit this third option. 
The conclusion that the European Union should reduce its institutional 
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asymmetry, and therefore the connected inequalities, moving towards a 
stronger social integration is reached through the adoption of John Rawls’s 
social contract theory2. In order to apply Rawls's A Theory of Justice (1999) 
and to draw the related conclusions, at European level the coexistence of 
two specific features has to be ascertained: a) a mutually advantageous 
cooperation among the interested parties and b) a thick set of formal insti-
tutions which defines a common basic structure. 
Proved that the two elements exist, the direct output derived from the 
application of Rawls's model to the European Union is a European redis-
tributive principle – the so-called difference principle –, which requires to 
redistribute the common resources in order to maximize the expectations 
of the most disadvantaged European(s). This main result is then followed 
by a corollary: if the European institutions are to be shaped in order to re-
flect an institutional arrangement of Rawlsian nature, they should also in-
clude Fiscal Union, meant as a pool of resources dedicated to pursuing so-
cial justice at European level. 
The locution Fiscal Union has many shades, so depending on the context 
it can suggest multiple aims (Musgrave and Musgrave, 1989), it can be 
implemented in different degrees and it can be characterized by different 
specific elements (Cottarelli and Guerguil, 2015; Fuest and Peichl, 2012). 
For instance, Fiscal Union might be realized with the aim to provide some 
specific transnational public goods. Fiscal Union is also associated to the 
concept of shared and binding tax rules between states. Another possible 
interpretation concerns a shared pool of resources aimed at facing together 
some common risks. All these representations might be relevant when they 
are associated to the European context. 
However, throughout the next pages the Fiscal Union concept has to be 
interpreted only in the perspective of a system which can pool together the 
resources necessary to pursue an institutional arrangement of Rawlsian 
nature at European level. Therefore, in the analysis, neither economic fac-
tors (specific tax policies, exact amount of the common budget, etc.) nor 
political equilibria (legitimization, decision-making powers, etc.) will be 
directly taken into consideration. 
The next Sections are structured as it follows. Section 2 introduces 
Rawls’ social contract theory. Section 3 looks at the previous literature on 
applying Joh Rawls’s theory to the European context. Section 4 lingers on 
the two conditions to apply Rawls’s domestic theory to the European 
framework. Section 5 is descriptive and focuses the attention on the Euro-
                                                 
2 Alternative perspectives might be adopted to derive principles of European social jus-
tice (Dunaiski, 2013; Manners, 2008; Rawls and Van Parijs, 2003; Sangiovanni, 2013; 
Scharpf, 2002; Van Parijs, 2012; Viehoff, 2017 and 2018). 
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pean economic cooperation and on the current European institutional ar-
rangement. Section 6 provides the main outcome of applying Rawls’s 
frame to the European Union, that is the European difference principle. 
Section 7 lingers on a corollary of the main achievement, that is European 
Fiscal Union. The Conclusions summarize the main ideas and provide 
some insights for the future research. 
2 John Rawls between Domestic and International 
Distributive Justice 
In order to identify the main principles for a fair institutional arrange-
ment in A Theory of Justice John Rawls (1999) proposes a contractualist 
procedure3. In particular, according to Rawls, the institutions of a modern 
society should be shaped to reflect as much as possible the set of norms 
impartially agreed behind a veil of ignorance – a gnoseological tool which 
excludes the access to any particular information to the parties involved in 
the agreement (Rawls, 1999; pp. 118-23). However, the agreement phase “is 
not [...] thought of as an actual historical state of affairs” but it is rather 
“understood as a purely hypothetical situation” (Rawls, 1999; p. 11), that is 
the veil of ignorance procedure is nothing but an individual mental ex-
periment which assumes a comparative content (Rawls, 1999; pp. 11-6). 
Rawls develops then two distinct contractualist theories, one focused on 
national institutions (Rawls, 1999) and the other one with an international 
horizon (Rawls, 1993; 2001).  
At the basis of the national social contract theory Rawls places the fol-
lowing observation: 
 
“although a society is a cooperative venture for mutual advantage, it is 
typically marked by a conflict as well as by an identity of interests. There is 
an identity of interests since social cooperation makes possible a better life 
for all than any would have if each were to live solely by his own efforts”; 
however, “there is a conflict of interests since persons are not indifferent as 
to how the greater benefits produced by their collaboration are distribut-
ed, for in order to pursue their ends they each prefer a larger to a lesser 
share” (Rawls, 1999; p. 4). 
 
In order to deal with these conflicting interests Rawls (1999; p. 13) out-
lines two specific principles derived through the contractualist procedure 
                                                 
3 A procedure where the legitimacy and the foundation of political and moral institu-
tions is set through an agreement (Boucher and Kelly, 2003; Darwall, 2003; Skyrms, 
1996). 
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based on the veil of ignorance: the first principle establishes the imple-
mentation of a scheme of individual liberties as broad as possible and 
compatible with the liberties of everybody else; the second principle, rela-
beled by Rawls himself as difference principle, requires redistributing re-
sources4 in order to maximize the expectations of the most disadvantaged 
individual(s). 
Rawls’s international theory, named The Law of Peoples, is based on a 
second level agreement (Rawls, 2001; p. 10 and p. 41), where the involved 
subjects are not single individuals but (representatives of) peoples. In this 
case Rawls abandons the idea of societies interacting between them as co-
operatives for mutual advantage and “decomposes” the international set-
ting in three distinct moments (Rawls, 2001, p. 70; Paden, 1997, p. 222). 
The first and the second part (Rawls 2001, pp. 11-88) deal with the so 
called “ideal theory”, where liberal and decent (or hierarchical)5 societies, 
behind the veil of ignorance, agree on a set of eight norms regulating the 
international relationships between them (Rawls 2001, p. 37). The last of 
these principle states that “peoples have a duty to assist other peoples liv-
ing under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent 
political and social regime”6. The third moment (Rawls, 2001, pp. 89-120), 
split by Rawls into two sub-types of “non ideal theory” (Rawls, 2001, p. 90), 
deals with outlaw states and burdened societies, which are excluded from 
the international social contract, because given their unfavourable condi-
tions or their unreasonable views they would neither agree nor comply 
with reasonable principles of international justice (Beitz, 2000, p. 676)7. 
                                                 
4 Resources in terms of social primary goods, that is "things which it is supposed a ra-
tional man wants whatever else he wants" (Rawls, 1999, p. 79). 
5 Decent societies, though they are not liberal, they are characterized by the two fol-
lowing features: they do not have aggressive aims towards other peoples and they 
respect human rights (Rawls, 2001, pp. 64-7). 
6 The duty of assistance was not included in the first version of The Law of Peoples 
(Rawls, 1993, p. 43). 
7 This partition implies that the parties entering the international agreement are required 
to know whether they are liberal, hierarchical, burdened societies or outlaw states 
(Rawls, 2001, p. 71, note 10), that is they are supposed to be aware about their own 
conception of the good. However, in A Theory of Justice Rawls (1999, p. 118; 2001, p. 34) 
explicitly assumes that the veil of ignorance prevents the parties involved in the 
agreement from knowing their particular conception of the good. This concern gener-
ated some reactions concerning the real “thickness” of the international veil compared 
to the domestic one. (Paden, 1997, p. 219; Buchanan, 2000, pp. 704-7, Caney, 2002, pp. 
99-114; Kuper, 2000, pp. 648-50; Pogge 1994, pp. 206-7; Pogge 2001 p. 247). 
Klaser: A Theory of Justice of John Rawls as Basis for European Fiscal Union 
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/328 7 
This byzantine structure given by Rawls to his international theory 
shows two things: the domestic principles of justice do not suit the inter-
national context; the international principles themselves are not univer-
sally valid, since they are not shared by all kinds of peoples (Nagel, 2005, p. 
127), in the sense that some of them do not hold the minimal political or 
economic conditions to reach a fair and durable agreement. This discrimi-
nation is even more evident when we focus on the distributive issue. For 
example, remarking the duty of assistance Rawls makes clear how the 
domestic difference principle, "even though it is a universal principle that 
is to apply severally, or within every society, [it] is not global in reach" 
(Freeman, 2006, p. 29), that is it is not transnational. Or again, it is not clear 
why liberal and decent societies, the only ones who take part in the second 
order agreement, through the duty of assistance should assume a one-way 
altruistic commitment towards burdened societies (Pettit, 2006, p. 54). 
More in general, according to Rawls, distributive justice holds within 
societies but not between societies (Barcelos, et al., 2008, p. 3; Nagel, 2005, 
p. 114; Pogge, 1994, p. 195; Wenar, 2006, p. 99). Thus, Rawls establishes a 
marked: 
 
“distinction between the strong solidarity which must govern a gen-
erous redistribution between the members of the national community they 
claim to represent and the much weaker solidarity which must govern a 
more parsimonious and conditional assistance from the richer national 
communities to the poorer ones” (Van Parijs, 2012a, p. 643). 
 
Therefore, “it may make a great deal of difference on Rawls's theory 
where the boundary of [a] society is drawn” (Scanlon, 1973, p. 1066), be-
cause for instance “it does not really matter whether one is born in Kansas 
or in Iowa” while “it matters a great deal whether one is born a Mexican or 
a U. S. citizen” (Pogge, 1994, p. 198). 
These strict restrictions to the international redistributive dimension 
given by Rawls, who conceives only a weak duty of solidarity between 
national societies, have been hardly criticized by the secondary literature 
(Beitz, 1999, p. 138; Loriaux, 2012, pp. 20-1; Nagel, 2005, pp. 119; 124; 
Pogge, 1988, p. 238; Pogge, 2001, Pogge, 2006), mainly because Rawls’ in-
ternational theory seems to ignore the paramount pillar of A Theory of Jus-
tice: to provide a fair institutional arrangement “that prevents the use of the 
accidents of natural endowment and the contingencies of social circum-
stance as counters in a quest for political and economic advantage” (Rawls, 
1999, p. 14; Sandel, 2009, pp. 150-166). 
Rawls also tries to provide a justification for not considering an analo-
gous of the difference principle valid at international level, but for con-
ceiving only a weaker duty of solidarity: 
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS Vol. 11, Issue 1/2, Article 4 
 




“I believe that the causes of the wealth of a people and the forms it takes 
lie in their political culture and in the religious, philosophical, and moral 
traditions [...], as well as in the industriousness and cooperative talents of 
its’’ (Rawls, 2001, p. 108). 
 
Therefore, according to Rawls, the differences between societies in terms 
of available resources as well as of political and economic development 
should not be attributed to pure arbitrary contingencies, but rather to spe-
cific and conscious choices made by the involved societies themselves 
(Rawls, 2001, pp. 117-8). In other words, it seems that according to Rawls 
“the causes of international inequality [are to be considered] purely do-
mestic” (Pogge, 2001, p. 252) so that if a society is poor, also from an insti-
tutional point of view, it is because that society decided to be poor (Rawls, 
2001, pp.117-8). This means that a redistributive principle between socie-
ties as strong as the difference principle is not necessary because redistrib-
utive issues do not emerge beyond the domestic realities singularly taken. 
In conclusion, according to Rawls, distributive justice is polyhedral, 
because the international context is characterized by different elements and 
raises distinct issues, and therefore it requires different principles and in-
stitutions compared to the domestic case (Kim, 2015, pp. 474-8; Pettit, 2006, 
p. 52; Wenar, 2006, pp. 102-4). Rawls himself explicitly states that “how 
peoples treat each other and how they treat their own members are, it is 
important to recognize, two different things” (Rawls, 2001, p. 83), high-
lighting how to two distinct issues of redistributive justice might corre-
spond two alternative approaches and then two distinct solutions, that is 
two sets of non-overlapping principles (Nagel, 2005, pp. 122-4 and p. 127). 
Therefore, even though some authors accused Rawls of creating a 
“structural disanalogy” between his domestic and his international theo-
ries (Pogge, 2001, p. 249; Pogge, 2003, pp. 1745-6), Rawls is pretty clear on 
the matter and the differences that emerge in the outcomes should not be 
interpreted as between-theories inconsistencies, but more simply as dif-
ferent approaches and conclusions to different issues or circumstances. 
3 John Rawls’s Social Contract Theories and the Eu-
ropean Union 
Given the purposes of this paper, it is now important to understand 
which of the two approaches – the domestic or the international one – and 
therefore which set of Rawlsian principles is more suitable to approach the 
European institutional framework. This is not a straightforward task for 
two main reasons: first of all, Rawls does not include the European Union 
Klaser: A Theory of Justice of John Rawls as Basis for European Fiscal Union 
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as a formal object of any of his theories; second, such as structured, the 
European Union is neither a nation or a state, nor mankind as a whole (Van 
Parijs, 2012). Therefore “none of the values defended [in Rawls’s] works 
[might provide] alone a definitive axiological model that might elucidate 
the character of the European Union” (Barcelos et al., 2008, p. 6). 
Furthermore, it is necessary to take into account how Rawls’s rare ex-
plicit references to the European Union manifest some Eurosceptic traits: 
"one question the Europeans should ask themselves, if I may hazard a 
suggestion, is how far-reaching they want their union to be"; or "the large 
open market including all of Europe is aim of the large banks and the cap-
italist business class whose main goal is simply larger profit" (Rawls and 
Van Parijs, 2003, p. 9). Given the indeterminate theoretical frame men-
tioned above and relying on these few sentences, most of the previous at-
tempts provided an unfavourable interpretation of the European project in 
the light of Rawls’s thought. 
Kamminga (2014) rejects the possibility to interpret the European Union 
from any Rawlsian perspective. In particular, in Kamminga’s opinion, the 
European Union does not have the structure of a Rawlsian domestic soci-
ety because the Union lacks a clear single political unity and because its 
relations occur between states rather than between single individuals. At 
the same time, the European Union does not meet the requirements of the 
Rawlsian international theory because the former, accepting as members 
only fully liberal societies and not quasi-liberal ones, is too selective. 
According to Barcelos and Queiroz (2008) the European Union is an 
unidentified political object, characterized by a mix of national and inter-
national elements, therefore we cannot approach this hybrid entity with 
the pure Rawlsian theories as they are. They claim that “given this hybrid 
nature of the Union, the description of its values by analogy with the do-
mestic society [...] is, therefore, unacceptable […] This same hybridism, in 
the same way, excludes the possibility of conforming the EU to the [...] 
model defended in The Law of Peoples” (Barcelos and Queiroz, 2008, p. 9). 
Using a numerical example Morgan (2008) shows the implicit contra-
dictions that emerge from a European (between states) redistributive 
scheme replacing the national (within states) redistributive policies: with a 
unique over-arching distributive mechanism which substitutes the nation-
al ones there is the concrete risk that a “society, or group of such societies, 
[ends up being] worse off under a [common transnational principle or 
scheme] than in perfect isolation” (Pogge, 1988, p. 249). 
To the best of my knowledge, there is only one contribution (Wolthuis, 
2017) which provides a positive exegesis of the European project in 
Rawlsian perspective. Wolthuis (2017) considers transnational economic 
unions – including therefore the particular case of the European Union – as 
proper subjects for an approach of Rawlsian type. Through a specific veil 
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of ignorance procedure, he derives a set of four specific principles of justice 
valid for economically integrated societies. (Wolthuis, 2017, p. 465) 8 . 
However, as far as the European Union is directly concerned, in my opin-
ion his attempt is only partially successful for at least two reasons. 
First of all, Wolthuis (2017, p. 465) reaches modest conclusions because 
he basically ends up with a minimal configuration that substantially justi-
fies the status quo with principles that are “familiar, fortunately”. There-
fore, it is true that stretching and adapting Rawls’s theories Wolthuis 
manages to include the European Union case within a general Rawlsian 
frame. Nevertheless, and this is extremely relevant for this paper, as far as 
the redistributive matter is concerned, Wolthuis does not seem to go much 
further than Rawls’s international duty of assistance, because the differ-
ence principle keeps remaining exclusively statist. Indeed, Wolthuis’s 
principle of fair equality of economic opportunity for economic unions 
does not seem to require the transnational institutions to actively redis-
tribute resources across borders, but rather to guarantee that the union 
market works fairly. 
Second, portraying the subjects belonging to an economic union as Ja-
nus-faced, in my opinion Wolthuis does not take into sufficient considera-
tion the risk of deriving a “whole family of [principles] each corresponding 
to one dimension of our identities” (Van Parijs, 2012a, p. 643; Nagel, 2005, 
pp. 141-2). It is true that Wolthuis wisely acknowledges the problem of the 
hierarchy between different sets of principles. However, Wolthuis does not 
exhaustively explain how his four intermediate principles interact with 
those at domestic and at international level. For instance, he presents the 
first two principles for economic unions (equal distributions of basic rights 
and fair equality of economic opportunity) as “corrections or amend-
ments” of the Rawlsian domestic principles of justice (Wolthuis, 2017, p. 
466). Two supranational principles that at first glance should not conflict 
with the other Rawlsian principles. Nonetheless, he neither explains 
whether this means that the former completely substitute the latter nor he 
says much about how a possible parallel application of the two sets of 
principles solves contradictions of the type highlighted above by other 
authors (Morgan, 2008; Pogge, 1988). 
Summarizing, what emerges from this brief review is that the theoretical 
emptiness left by John Rawls – who does not conceive any specific frame 
for intermediate entities like the European Union –, much more than his 
few negative references concerning the European integration, paved the 
                                                 
8 Wolthuis (2017, p. 465) lists four principles for economic unions: a principle of equal 
distribution of basic rights; a principle of fair equality of economic opportunity; a 
principle of conferral; a principle of equal representation of member societies. 
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way to the climacteric views on the European Union in the perspective of 
his social contract theories. At the same time, the only proactive attempt 
(Wolthuis, 2017) looks like to be still too conservative, in particular about a 
clear European redistributive scheme and its possible interactions with 
principles of distributive justice at other levels. 
4 The Two Conditions to Apply Rawls’s Domestic 
Theory to the European Framework 
In order to reach some more ambitious conclusions concerning redis-
tribution of resources at European level, I suggest applying Rawls’s do-
mestic justice to the European Union in a straightforward way. Thus, dif-
ferently from Kamminga (2014), Barcelos and Queiroz (2008), Morgan 
(2008) and Wolthuis (2017) – who basically proposes hybrid principles for 
hybrid institutions based on a hybrid Rawlsian procedure – I claim the 
possibility to linearly extend Rawls’s domestic approach to the European 
Union. In particular, differently from Wolthuis (2017), I try to preserve the 
structure of Rawls’s theory as much as possible. Indeed, I claim that we are 
allowed to extend the range of applicability of the Rawlsian domestic the-
oretical frame to the European Union to the extent that the European 
framework holds two elements9, considered by Rawls himself sufficient 
and necessary to trigger a redistributive issue of domestic type: 
 
a) a scheme of mutually advantageous cooperation among the involved 
parties which generates benefits and conflicts (Rawls, 1999, p. 4); 
b) a set of institutions which constitute a basic structure (Rawls 1977; 
1999) – that is "the way in which the major social institutions fit together 
into one system, and how they assign fundamental rights and duties and 
shape the division of advantages that arises through social cooperation” 
(Rawls, 1977, p. 159; Rawls, 1987, p. 3 for an alternative formulation). 
 
In other words, in contrast to the previous literature on the topic, in this 
paper I argue that with the contemporary presence of these elements it is 
admissible to apply Rawls’s domestic categories and to draw the related 
                                                 
9 I assume that together with the two mentioned elements – cooperation and institutions 
– all the other Rawlsian “circumstances of justice”, that is “the normal conditions un-
der which human cooperation is both possible and necessary”, are completely fulfilled 
(Rawls, 1999, pp. 109-11). 
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conclusions at any level, included the European Union10. This without in-
troducing any modification or extension of the Rawlsian theories. Having 
in mind the two mentioned conditions it is also easier to understand better 
why Rawls refuses to conceive a strong redistributive scheme valid at in-
ternational level. Within Rawls’s international theory the two mentioned 
elements are completely missing or more simply ignored. 
Indeed, for Rawls there is not a context of cooperation between peoples 
qualitatively similar to the one between individuals belonging to a domes-
tic system (Barry, 1982; Beitz, 1999, pp. 132-43; Freeman, 2006, p. 39): in the 
examples provided by Rawls (2001, pp.117-8) it is not mentioned any sort 
of social or economic interaction between the two societies taken as refer-
ence. Instead, the two societies are presented as economically isolated and 
independent one from each other, that is they are basically designed as 
autarkies (Martin, 2015, p. 748). 
                                                 
10 Nevertheless, in my opinion, the Rawlsian international theory should not be dis-
missed, because it can anyway provide some (even if limited) insights about the cur-
rent European Union institutional framework. Indeed for Rawls a just Europe (world) 
is basically represented by a Europe (world) of intrinsically just states (Barcelos et al., 
2008, pp. 4-5; Nagel, 2005, p. 115; Pogge, 1988, p. 235). Thus, that the European Union 
is, according to Rawls, a just international arrangement becomes true in the light of 
Article 49 of the Treaty of Lisbon which identifies the minimum qualifications that a 
candidate country must satisfy to enter the Union. These minimum requirements are 
also recalled in Article 2, in Article 6 of the same Treaty and more generally within the 
criteria of Copenhagen. They go from stability of institutions to democracy, from re-
spect of human rights to equality. All these mentioned elements coincide with the 
features which contribute to make a society just in Rawls’s perspective (1999; 2001). 
Thus we can claim that according to Rawls’s international justice the European Union 
is a just international arrangement. However, it is also appropriate to recognize how 
the European Union, given the current level of interdependence between its member 
states, is much more than a simple set of independent and endogenously just societies. 
Therefore, Rawls’s international justice provides a pragmatic but limited perspective to 
look at the European Union. Adopting Rawls’s domestic social contract can provide a 
more complete and complementary interpretation of the European Union institutional 
arrangement, in particular contemplating a redistributive scheme between its member 
states. Then, in another place, it might be also interesting to discuss how the renege of 
one country to comply with the minimum requirements affects the European just ar-
rangement or its domestic interpretation. I am thankful to an anonymous reviewer for 
raising this point. 
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Moreover, according to Rawls, there is not an international basic struc-
ture as qualitatively solid as the national ones (Buchanan, 2000, pp. 700-1; 
Freeman, 2006, p. 39; Pogge, 2003, p. 1741; Reidy, 2007, p. 209). Therefore: 
 
“the idea of social cooperation [...] is central to Rawls’s account of social 
justice. It underlies his distinction between ‘domestic justice’ and the Law 
of Peoples. Moreover, the idea of social cooperation informs Rawls’s ac-
count of the difference principle. What makes social cooperation possible 
for Rawls are the basic institutions that constitute ‘the basic structure’” 
(Freeman, 2006, p. 38). 
 
In synthesis, according to Rawls, the derivation of a redistributive prin-
ciple at international level is neither required nor formally conceivable 
because there are not the minimal structural conditions which trigger re-
distributive concerns. 
Lastly, I deliberately avoid entering the debate on which further ele-
ments in the literature are considered essential to justify redistributive 
principles and institutions, like for example a certain degree of coercion 
(Nagel, 2005; Blake, 2001). Two are the reasons for this precautionary 
choice. First of all, the topic is quite recent and the debate on coercion is 
very animated and still open (Blake, 2016; Sangiovanni, 2016; Valentini, 
2011): trying to retrace it would uselessly complicate the theoretical 
framework necessary for the analysis of the European Union in a Rawlsian 
perspective. Second, and even more important, Rawls never makes explicit 
that the role of the principles of justice is to protect individuals from coer-
cive institutions. Indeed, within A Theory of Justice Rawls (1999) uses the 
words “coercion” and “coercive” only 20 times. So, coercion does not seem 
to be a fundamental element of the Rawlsian theory11. 
5 The European Union: Economic Cooperation and 
Basic Structure  
In this Section I aim at demonstrating that the two elements mentioned 
above – cooperation and network of institutions – exist at European level, 
so it is possible to linearly extend Rawls’s domestic approach to the Euro-
pean Union, conceiving a European social contract. However, before 
showing that the European Union holds these two requirements, I want to 
highlight how it is beyond the intentions of the present analysis to enter the 
debate on what the European Union is exactly –a federation, a confedera-
                                                 
11 Nevertheless it is clear that according to Rawls institutional coercion should be mini-
mized (Rawls, 1999, p. 211). 
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tion, an intergovernmental institution (Blankart, 2007)–, on how the pow-
ers within the Union are or should be balanced (Vaubel, 1996; Vaubel, 
1997), or on how its institutions are or should be legitimized (Coultrap, 
1999). The existence of certain structural elements is independent from 
how we prefer labelling the European Union. In other words, in this Sec-
tion I adopt a descriptive approach12. 
As far as the first feature is concerned, it is quite immediate to 
acknowledge a scheme of economic cooperation between the European 
individuals. Beitz (1999, p. 154) suggests that the “international economic 
interdependence constitutes a scheme of social cooperation” as much as 
Rawls (1999, p. 4) means for a simple national (closed) system. In the spe-
cific case of the European Union Beitz’s insight is even more pertinent and 
compelling: the economic integration process, which formally begun with 
the Treaty of Rome (1957, Title I and Title III)13 and that gave birth to the 
European Economic Community (Single Market), with its free circulation 
of goods, people, services and capitals, constitutes a distinguishable pat-
tern of cooperation as meant by Rawls. 
Furthermore, it should be also undiscussable how this European eco-
nomic interdependence is favourable to all the involved parties, also be-
cause the positive outcomes derived from a market enlargement are 
broadly recognized since Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations (Smith 1994), 
who grasped the advantages of the size of a market on division of labour, 
and then on productivity. The field literature is not unanimous about the 
exact quantitative benefits derived from the European economic integra-
tion (Badinger and Breuss, 2011; Baldwin et al., 1997, Campos et al., 2014; 
König and Ohr, 2012). However, notwithstanding different methodologies 
and a quantitative disagreement, many empirical studies – together with a 
copious theoretical literature on economic integration (Rosamond 2000; 
Balassa, 2011) – highlight how the European countries positively benefit 
from the common market (Badinger and Breuss, 2011, p. 308). 
 Thus, over the period 1950-2000 the “European integration has signifi-
cantly contributed to the post-war growth performance of the current EU 
member states” such that “GDP per capita of the EU would be approxi-
mately one-fifth lower today if no integration had taken place” (Badinger, 
2005, pp. 73-4). At the same way Crespo Cuaresma et al. (2008, p. 652) 
conclude that the “EU membership has had a positive […] effect on 
                                                 
12 According to Blake (2012, pp. 122-6), empirical elements of this type are liable of disa-
greement. 
13 Of course it is not necessary a formal treaty for the existence of mutually advantageous 
economic and social relationships. Nevertheless a formal treaty strengthens the analy-
sis (Buchanan, 1996, p. 141). 
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long-term economic growth” of the EU-15 member states. Again, “there 
seems to be strong evidence on positive pay-offs from EU membership, 
despite considerable heterogeneity across countries” and in a prudent 
counterfactual evaluation “incomes would have been around 12 per cent 
lower today if European Integration had not happened” (Campos et al., 
2014, pp. 21; 25). Therefore, from these few empirical instances and from 
the legislative frame explained above, the overlap between the Rawlsian 
concept of a venture for the mutual advantage and the European Economic 
Community appears unquestionable. 
It might be legitimate to wonder whether the cooperative for the mutual 
advantage assumption holds in the case of a stagnant (or even decreasing) 
European GDP or in case the growth rates diverge significantly between 
the member states. Both issues can be addressed looking at Rawls. First, it 
does not really matter whether the European Union keeps growing or not. 
From a Rawlsian point of view, the only thing that matters is that the Eu-
ropean states together are better off than compared to a stand-alone posi-
tion. As long as this is true, a cooperative for the mutual advantage exists. 
In the same way, and this is the second concern, differences in wealth or 
growth rates between member states should not destabilize the perception 
of the venture for the mutual advantage. Indeed, according to Rawls, “so-
cial and economic inequalities, for example inequalities of wealth and 
[growth], are just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, 
and in particular for the least advantaged members of society” (Rawls, 
1999, p. 13). In other words, the gaps between the richest and the poorest, 
or in this case between the fastest and the slowest member state do not 
count. 
As for the second element considered essential in order to apply Rawls’s 
domestic theory, it is possible to identify within the European Union a set 
of supranational institutions and agencies which constitute a solid Euro-
pean basic structure. The Treaty of Lisbon (Article 13) formally lists seven 
common institutions whose task is to manage the Union and to integrate 
the conflicting interests (Peterson and Shackleton, 2012): European Par-
liament, European Council, Council (of Ministers), European Commission, 
Court of Justice of the European Union, European Central Bank and Court 
of Auditors14. Moreover, these authorities are not mere second-side insti-
tutions which only aim at fostering the national ones (Blake, 2013, pp. 
108-32), but they act with their own goals. 
                                                 
14 For the purposes of the analysis it is not considered essential either to provide a de-
tailed description of the European institutional framework nor, as stated in advance, 
enter a debate regarding the equilibria between them or their legitimization. 
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND INSTITUTIONS Vol. 11, Issue 1/2, Article 4 
 
2020 University of Perugia Electronic Press. 
 
16 
These seven institutions are then surrounded by hundreds of agencies 
and organizations (Mathieu, 2016) which, performing sometimes at the 
limits of their formal powers (Chamon, 2016), operate in accordance with 
the guidelines of the former. These agencies operate within different 
spheres, ranging from ensuring an area of freedom, security and justice 
(Frontex, the European Border and Cosat Guard Agency) to supervising 
financial systems (European Banking Authority), from providing defence 
(European Defence Agency) to supporting EU business and innovation in 
the digital, energy, innovation and transport sectors, from directly foster-
ing citizens’ well-being (European Centre for Disease Prevention and 
Control) to helping the countries to exploit the potential of their human 
capital (European Training Foundation). 
Basically, the main European institutions, together with all the agencies 
which surround them, constitute a thick institutional network, or in 
Rawlsian terms, a European basic structure. However, this conclusion re-
quires two further remarks. 
First of all, for Rawls, in the definition of a basic structure the quantity of 
institutions is not relevant; what matters is their quality: together they are 
supposed to be capable of affecting people’s prospects of life through the 
distribution of the benefits derived from economic cooperation. Consid-
ered from this perspective the European institutional network can effec-
tively and concretely “distribute fundamental rights and duties and de-
termine the division of advantages from social cooperation” (Rawls, 1999, 
p. 6). They can deeply affect Europeans’ plans of life: a ban on pesticides 
voted by the European Parliament effectively redistributes duties and 
rights between European citizens; a sentence of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union can directly and radically affect the prospect of life of any 
(group of) European citizen(s) in case the national laws conflict with the 
European ones; again, the European Central Bank, setting the interest rate, 
through the financial and credit institutes, can effectively redistribute the 
benefits of the European economic cooperation. 
Second, a basic structure is not a binary zero-one outcome, which either 
does not exist at all or which exists through its full configuration. Instead, a 
basic structure is an arrangement which spans on a continuous spectrum 
but which, according to Rawls, should constantly tend to one, so much so 
that “adjustments in the basic structure are always necessary” even in an 
institutionally complete society (Rawls, 1977, p. 164). In other words, the 
current European institutional framework represents a configuration 
which should be considered “just throughout, but not the best just ar-
rangement” (Rawls, 1999, p. 68). Thus, the idea of moving towards a more 
complete European basic structure, which can affect the prospects of life of 
European citizens by redistributing the benefits of the cooperation in an 
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even more incisive degree than the current institutional arrangement, is the 
exact attitude of this paper. 
To recapitulate, given the contemporary existence of a scheme of mutu-
ally advantageous economic cooperation and of a basic structure at Euro-
pean level it is possible to apply Rawls’s A Theory of Justice and to conceive 
a European social contract theory. 
6 The Outcome of the European Social Contract of 
Domestic Nature 
In this Section I make explicit the principles of Rawlsian nature which 
are supposed to shape the European institutional arrangement. Following 
a reasoning by analogy, I claim that European individuals behind the veil 
of ignorance would agree on the standard principles of domestic type 
(Rawls, 1999, pp. 52-65; 65-73; 130-39; 153-60), with the further feature that 
now these act across the European member states, regardless of the na-
tional borders, because the range of application of the principles is essen-
tially tailored on the dimension of the basic structure (extension of coop-
eration) considered behind the veil (Martin, 2006, pp. 227-34; Martin, 2015, 
p. 749). 
In other words, the European social contract is qualitatively equivalent 
to the one for a domestic society, therefore the same structural conditions 
imply the same outcome, that is the same set of principles. There are no 
further elements that the involved parties can take into consideration be-
hind the European veil of ignorance. Only the spatial variable becomes 
somehow relevant: since the Europeans are deprived of any particular in-
formation concerning the European country where they (might) live – 
natural resources, size of population, boundaries, economic development 
and activity, etc. (Rawls, 1999, pp. 32-3) – the principles now operate across 
the whole European territory. 
As far as the redistributive issue is concerned, I claim that behind the 
veil of ignorance the European citizens would agree to redistribute the 
benefits of the European economic cooperation to the greatest benefit of the 
least advantaged European(s), regardless the country or the nationality: 
this is equivalent to enunciate a European difference principle which op-
erates across and beyond the boundaries of the single European member 
states. In this way the difference principle replaces its “statist” assumptions 
(Kuper, 2000, pp. 653-4) and it becomes transnational15, even though de-
rived from the application of A Theory of Justice. 
                                                 
15 The existence of a redistributive principle between individuals belonging to different 
states may trigger the issue of redefining the Rawlsian bundle of social primary goods 
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In this context it is important to highlight that the European difference 
principle acts at individual level, so it does not require to redistribute to-
wards the worst-off member state. Ad absurdum, if redistribution took 
place between member states instead of between European citizens, ac-
cording to the difference principle we should move resources from Greece 
or Poland (higher GDP) towards Luxembourg or Sweden (lower GDP), 
even though Luxembourgian and Norwegians have a higher GDP per 
capita compared to Polish and Greek citizens. More in general it is possible 
to recognize how “the interests of persons and peoples do not necessarily 
coincide”, and country-cantered settings might lead to “potentially 
sub-optimal results for persons” (Kuper, 2000, pp. 246-7; Morgan, 2008), 
since “the interests of individual persons are taken into account only indi-
rectly” (Beitz, 2000, pp. 673-4; Nagel, 2005, p. 134). This might be a further 
reason why John Rawls, in his international social contract theory, does not 
conceive a strong redistributive principle: in The Law of Peoples the in-
volved parties are peoples (Rawls, 2001, p. 23, note 17; p. 35)16. 
In synthesis, with the European Union we move from the basic interna-
tional situation conceived by John Rawls, where national entities operate 
independently as autarkies and care only about the distribution of their 
inner resources – an agreement for redistribution at international level is 
therefore unnecessary –, to a framework where countries have a certain 
degree of cooperation and share a set of common institutions. This cir-
cumstance requires an agreement on how to distribute the benefits gener-
ated by the European cooperation, because without a shared redistributive 
scheme market forces and bargaining powers prevail, and “the distribution 
resulting from voluntary market transactions […] is not, in general, fair 
[…] even though nobody acts unfairly” Rawls (1977, p. 160). However, this 
unregulated situation is avoided through the European social contract, 
which provides clear principles of social justice for the European Union 
and contributes to expand the social intervention area of the European in-
stitutions. 
As far as the European difference principle is concerned, I consider es-
sential one final remark: the European distributive scheme neither substi-
tutes nor takes over the national welfare systems, because does not act on 
all the available resources, both national and communitarian. Instead, the 
                                                                                                                                     
(Paden, 1997, pp. 226-7; Rawls, 1999, pp. 78-81). However this concern lies outside of 
the present analysis. 
16 To explore other theoretical reasonings for considering collective entities like states 
inadequate for the European social contract and for taking individuals as “unit of 
measurement” see Beitz (1999, p. 132), Buchanan (2000, p. 698), Pogge (1988, p. 235; 
1994, p. 197; 2006, p. 206) and Rawls and Van Parijs (2003, p. 10). 
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European redistributive policy is complementary and integrates the na-
tional ones, filling in this way the institutional gap and the zone of social 
emptiness identified in the Introduction. Indeed, the European social con-
tract prescribes to redistribute only the surplus generated by the social and 
economic cooperation which takes place at European level; conversely, the 
benefits generated by the cooperation which takes place exclusively within 
the single countries, with no European interdependence, remain immune 
from the European redistributive policy. 
In other words, according to the European social contract it would be 
illegitimate to redistribute across Europe resources generated by the social 
and economic cooperation which takes place exclusively within the 
boundaries of the single member states. Paradoxically, applying a unique 
European redistributive policy on the total surplus (national and European 
together) might erode the welfare of some individuals who are better-off in 
isolation: this is the contradictory situation sketched by Morgan (2008, p. 
9). However, this is not the situation I design in this paper, because the re-
distribution of resources prescribed by the European difference principle 
concerns only on the surplus generated by means of the European (be-
tween-states) cooperation, leaving untouched the benefits produced by the 
within-states cooperation17. 
In this way the European social welfare policy embodied in the differ-
ence principle is neither exclusive nor conflicting with the national ones, 
but rather compatible and complementary: with a social contract of 
Rawlsian type the European redistributive scheme supplements the ones 
of its member states18 (Claassen, 2019), contributing to rebalance the in-
stitutional asymmetry between the economic and the social dimension at 
European level highlighted at the beginning. 
7 The European Social Contract as a Basis for Euro-
pean Fiscal Union 
In this Section I try to outline how the European surplus should be 
quantified and how the resources generated by means of the European 
cooperation should be pooled together to be redistributed across the Eu-
ropean countries. 
                                                 
17 I am aware that from a practical point of view it might be very controversial to cir-
cumscribe the two or more levels of cooperation. 
18 According to this view the following consideration becomes false: "[t]he difference 
principle can apply only once to structure economic and property institutions, either 
globally or domestically. It cannot apply to both." (Freeman, 2006, p. 63). 
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The quantitative estimate of the European surplus is an issue of empir-
ical investigation. An idea to calculate its amount is the counterfactual 
difference between the current level of the European economic activity and 
the aggregated but hypothetical economic level of the European countries 
acting as pure autarkies, that is with no transnational cooperation with 
other member states, basically like Rawls designed the international con-
text (Badinger, 2005; Campos et al., 2014; Crespo Cuaresma et al., 2008). 
As for the realization of the European social welfare policy embodied in 
the European social contract, I suggest how this might be obtained im-
plementing Fiscal Union at European level, that is a specific system aimed 
at pooling together into a common budget the resources generated by the 
European economic cooperation. In other words, in order to comply with 
the prescriptions of the European difference principle a common European 
budget, of the same amount of the European surplus, becomes necessary. 
Furthermore, in the specific perspective of this paper, Fiscal Union also 
becomes a way to complete the European basic structure (see the Section 
4). 
This paper cannot enter the debate regarding the practical implementa-
tion of European Fiscal Union, that is I do not have space to discuss here its 
technical or political feasibility. Nevertheless, I want to provide some 
general insights. There are two possible ways of interpreting European 
Fiscal Union as the result of a European social contract. On the one hand it 
is possible to think about a system which constantly collects and transfers 
the European surplus in order to maximize the expectations of the Euro-
pean worst-off – for instance, a European unemployment reinsurance 
scheme (Andor et al., 2014). On the other hand, it is also imaginable as a 
sort of common mechanism of insurance which acts against systemic risks 
(Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2016; Thirion, 2017) – de facto a European Stability 
Mechanism, or, in the light of the recent institutional developments due to 
the pandemic, something approximate to a Recovery Plan for sharing the 
national contingencies. In the latter perspective the European surplus is 
supposed to be collected in order to protect the weakest European parties 
in case of specific unfavourable conditions occur, or the budget might get 
into action when a set of European subjects goes below a certain agreed 
minimum threshold: for Rawls (1999, p. 244) this is equivalent to an insti-
tution belonging to the “stabilization branch”. 
About the way to implement concretely Fiscal Union at European level, 
that is to channel the cooperation benefits into a common budget, Rawls 
(1999, pp. 242-51) provides some hints when developing A Theory of Justice, 
and in particular the distributive branch. He states how one element of the 
“distribution branch is a scheme of taxation to raise the revenues”, and 
which “make[s] the transfer payments necessary to satisfy the difference 
principle” (Rawls, 1999, p. 246). Thus, a system of taxation at European 
Klaser: A Theory of Justice of John Rawls as Basis for European Fiscal Union 
http://www.rei.unipg.it/rei/article/view/328 21 
level might be considered a concurrent element for the implementation of 
European Fiscal Union in a Rawlsian perspective. 
Rawls then goes even further suggesting some specific taxes which 
might be adopted to generate the resources required for the redistribution 
scheme prescribed by the difference principle: inheritance and gift taxes; 
proportional expenditure tax, that is tax on consumption; a proportional 
tax on annual consumption; an income tax is considered as well. It is even 
possible to speculate about a tax on those activities which operate across 
the national borders (but within the Union), and so on and so forth. Clearly 
these ideas do not mean to be concrete proposals. They deserve a further 
deepening, since it is also necessary to consider that an improper tax 
scheme might generate frictions which can nullify the benefits of the 
common market. However, I consider this kind of elucubrations beyond 
the research question of this paper. 
8 Final Remarks and Conclusions 
The analysis concerning the European Union in the perspective A The-
ory of Justice of John Rawls can be summarized as it follows: the current 
constitutive elements which characterize the European Union framework – 
cooperation and basic structure – imply a precise redistributive scheme 
embodied in the European difference principle, which is supposed, acting 
only on the European surplus, to maximize the expectations of the least 
advantaged individual(s) across the whole European territory. A corollary 
of this European social contract concerns European Fiscal Union, which 
represents a possible way to implement the redistributive policy of 
Rawlsian nature, as well as to complete the European basic structure. Ac-
cording to this view the European social contract and Fiscal Union at Eu-
ropean level can contribute to shrink the institutional gap between the 
European economic framework and the European social integration, re-
ducing the structural inequalities which currently affect the Union. 
In reaching these conclusions we have to consider the difficulties to in-
terpret Rawls’s thought regarding the European Union, since he hardly 
ever lingers on the topic. Indeed, John Rawls does not directly put forward 
a specific theoretical frame to interpret the European Union. The contribu-
tion of this paper is to formulate the European social contract theory based 
on A Theory of Justice, and the application of the Rawlsian theory to the 
European context is reasonable for at least two reasons. 
On the one hand the European Union experienced by Rawls was very 
different from the today’s Union. Although Rawls shows some Eurosceptic 
traits when imagining a European project based on mere economic mo-
tives, the current European attributes allow us to go beyond the mere 
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functional structure of economic nature. Thus, it is no longer possible to 
have a European market, many European supranational institutions, a 
European common currency but not a European system of welfare redis-
tribution: such an institutional asymmetry unavoidably creates unjustified 
inequalities, mainly because of a “redistributive bias on national policy 
choices” (Scharpf, 1998, p. 6). 
On the other hand, we should also consider that Rawls himself, in a few 
lines of his texts, leaves open the possibility for a difference principle at 
European level within a federal frame. He clearly states how there is “room 
for various forms of cooperative associations and federations among peo-
ples” (Rawls, 2001, p. 36), sharing later the following hypothesis: 
 
“what does the [international social contract theory] say about the fol-
lowing situation? Suppose that two or more of the liberal democratic so-
cieties of Europe, say Belgium and the Netherlands, or these two together 
with France and Germany, decide they want to join and form a single so-
ciety, or a single federal union [...] A voter [behind the veil of ignorance] 
might vote for the difference principle (the most egalitarian liberal con-
ception)” between the two states (Rawls, 2001, p. 43, note 53). 
 
From a philosophical perspective, this idea is equivalent to realize a 
cosmopolitan initiative for a circumscribed set of states: "cosmopolitan 
justice could be realized in a federal system, in which the members of in-
dividual nation-states had special responsibilities toward one another that 
they did not have for everyone in the world" (Nagel, 2005, p. 120; Pogge, 
2001, p. 248). The cosmopolitan view (Blake, 2012, p. 127) raises from 
Beitz’s theory of global justice (1999, pp. 127-76), whose “intuitive idea is 
that it is wrong to limit the application of contractarian principles of social 
justice [only within] the nation-state” (Beitz, 1999, p. 128). Beitz's main 
achievement built on the Rawlsian domestic justice is a global difference 
principle where “the difference between citizens and foreigners is not 
morally significant” (Arnopoulos, 1981, p. 193). 
However, Beitz’s view is overly enthusiastic, because at global level 
there is not a set of institutions as qualitatively equivalent as a domestic 
basic structure – even if some authors think differently (Buchanan 2000, pp. 
705-6). In other words, any theory has to take into consideration “if there is 
[or not the] possibility of doing justice with the [international] institutions 
we have” (Blake, 2016, p. 318-9). Thus, Beitz (1999, p. 128) and other cos-
mopolitan authors are incautious insofar they do not endorse the existence 
of global conditions (institutions) for the application of redistributive 
principles at a global level (Blake, 2012, pp. 127-8; Pettit, 2006, p. 107). In-
stead, as I show in the paper, within the European Union there are the 
structural conditions for an analogue of the difference principle valid be-
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tween the European member states, and there is space for implementing 
European Fiscal Union. The strong and quick reaction of the European in-
stitutions to the Covid-19 pandemic seems to have accelerated the process 
towards this goal of social integration. 
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